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Abstract   The tuna resources of the Western and Central Pacific are the
world’s largest and most valuable fisheries of their type and are of significant
economic importance to the Pacific island countries through whose waters they
migrate. Two major concerns exist with the current governance of this fishery.
First, Pacific island countries receive only a small share of the resource rents
from the tuna fisheries. Second, the current management structure of the fisher-
ies will not ensure the long-term sustainability of the resources. This paper
derives a model to show that the sustainability of the resource can be improved
when a single policymaker acts as Stackelberg leader and sets a tax, or an
equivalent quantity instrument, to maximize rents from the resource. A practical
institutional mechanism is presented that mimics the model’s rent maximization
outcome and that offers substantial benefits to both Pacific island countries and
distant water fishing nations.
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Introduction
The Pacific Ocean spans more than a third of the earth’s surface and half of the
earth’s sea surface, an expanse of 180 million square kilometers. Scattered in the
Western and Central part of the Pacific Ocean are the 200 high islands and 2,500
low islands and atolls that comprise the 22 countries and territories of the Pacific
islands (figure 1). The Pacific islands’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs)1 exceed
landmass by an average factor of 3,000 to 1 (World Bank 2000). Not surprisingly,
the Pacific Ocean has had significant influence in the shaping of culture and econo-
mies of these nations.
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Figure 1.  The Western and Central Pacific Region: Exclusive Economic Zones
(Source: Secretariat of the Pacific Community 2000)Multilateral Governance of Fisheries: The Case of WCP Tuna 331
While coastal marine resources provide an important source of food, income,
culture, and recreation, offshore marine resources in the region are frontiers of high
economic and strategic potential. The Western and Central Pacific (WCP) Ocean is
home to the world’s largest and most valuable tuna fishery (table 1). The region sup-
plies one third of the global tuna supply and 40 to 60% of tuna to canneries (Tarte
1999). Tuna is the only significant natural resource of the Polynesian and
Micronesian communities.2 The value of the fishery in 1998 was US$1.9 billion,
equal to around 11% of the region’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Gillett et al.
2001). Domestic fishing fleets in the region are poorly developed and access fees
paid by distant water fishing nations (DWFNs), approximately US$60 million,
dominate benefits from the fishery accruing to the Pacific island countries (PICs).
Fishery revenue also constitutes a significant portion of government revenue, export
earnings, and GDP for many of the PICs, as shown in table 2.
Two major concerns exist with the governance of the WCP tuna fisheries. The
first is that the PICs are deriving only a small share of the benefits from exploitation
of their tuna resources. Bertignac et al. (2000) estimate that the overall resource rent
in the WCP tuna fisheries is around 13% of gross revenue at 1996 levels of effort.
Such rents are comparable to the fees, based on cost recovery alone, charged by the
Australian Fisheries Management Authority to fishers in the Australian bluefin tuna
fishery of approximately 11% of gross revenue (Australian Fisheries Management
Authority 2000). Bertignac et al. argue that if effort level and the fleet structure of
the fishery were at lower levels, the rent could be as high as 40% of gross sales. At
lower levels of exploitation, the maximum possible rents, as a proportion of gross
returns, would be comparable to what the European Union pays African countries
for access fees, which range from 18 and 45% of the value of their catch (Iheduru
1995). By contrast, PICs have negotiated access fees on the order of 3% of gross
revenue for the right to fish in their EEZs (Gillett et al. 2001).3 Thus, at the current
access fees and level of exploitation, PICs could potentially double their fees and
yet still receive less than half the total resource rents in the fisheries.
Table 1
Average Yearly Tuna Catch in the Major Tuna Fishing Areas, Late 1990s
Major Tuna Fishing Areas Average Yearly Tuna Catch (metric tons)
Western and Central Pacific 1,000,000
Eastern Pacific 525,000
West Africa 385,000
Western Indian Ocean 450,000
Source: Gillett et al. (2001).
2 The Pacific islands have three main cultural groups (although there is substantial blending of cultural
traits). The Melanesians settled in the high islands of Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, the
Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. These islands are rich in natural resources such as minerals, petroleum,
and forests. Melanesia contrasts with the resource-poor islands of Polynesia (Cook Islands, French
Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, Niue, Pitcairn, Tokelau, Tuvalu, American Samoa, Samoa, and Tonga) and
Micronesia (Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Northern Mariana
Islands, and Palau).
3 Note that some countries exchange bilateral aid (mainly from Japan) in exchange for cheap access,
which means that these figures are underestimates of effective access fees. The size of this underestima-
tion is not known.Chand, Grafton, and Petersen 332
The second major issue for the WCP tuna fisheries is that the current structure
of governance is not ensuring the long-term sustainability of the resource. Evidence
exists of economic overexploitation (Bertignac et al. 2000) and concern has been
raised that bigeye tuna, the most lucrative of the four tuna species in the fishery, is
being biologically overexploited (Secretariat of the Pacific Community 2002). Simi-
lar worries have also been voiced about the exploitation levels for yellowfin tuna
(Secretariat of the Pacific Community 2002).
To address these issues, this paper describes the existing institutions for multi-
lateral fisheries governance. We then describe current governance for tuna in the
WCP and highlight its institutional weaknesses. We follow with an innovative
model, where a single policymaker maximizes steady-state rents and ensures
sustainability of the resource through the use of an ad-valorem tax or an equivalent
quantity instrument. The proposed multilateral governance structure for the WCP
tuna fisheries that will encourage cooperation amongst PICs and DWFNs to achieve
the desired outcomes of the model is detailed in the fifth section. The paper con-
cludes with a review of the potential benefits and difficulties with implementing the
multilateral governance structure.
Existing Institutions for Multilateral Fisheries Governance
The third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) defined
property rights for the conservation and use of marine resources within 200 miles of
a state’s coastline, a region termed the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). UNCLOS
III was signed in 1982 and ratified in 1994 (United Nations 1994). The establish-
Table 2
Economic Statistics Showing the Importance of the
Fishing Industry for Selected Pacific Island Countries
Government Revenue Exports GDP
(percent) (percent of total value) (percent)
Cook Is. … 41 (1999) …
Fiji … 7 (1997) 1.4 (1998)
FSM 29 (1998) 92 (1997) 15.5 (1990)
Kiribati 61 (1998) 53 (1993) 9.5 (1993)
Marshall Is. 25 (1993) 94 (1997) …
New Caledonia … 27 (1996) …
Palau 5 (1993) - …
Papua New Guinea 2 (1999) 0.6 (1999) …
Samoa … - 6.2 (1999)
Solomon Is. ª 5 (1993) 20.1(1993) 9 (1993)
Tonga … 18 (1998) …
Tuvalu ª 35 (1993) - 5 (1993)
Vanuatu - <1 (1993) …
Notes: … = not available
- = negligible or zero
ª = approximately
< = less than
Source: Petersen (2002).Multilateral Governance of Fisheries: The Case of WCP Tuna 333
ment of these state-property rights was expected to significantly ease overexploita-
tion problems, as 90% of ocean’s fish harvests takes place within the coastal re-
gions. Moreover, the coastal states believed that DWFNs would not be able to
commercially harvest on the high seas unless they were granted access to national
waters by coastal states (Brasao, Costa-Duarte, and Cunha-e-Sa 2000). For many
high-seas fisheries, this belief has proven to be false, and important stocks in inter-
national waters continue to be subject to overexploitation.
In order to encourage cooperation in the management of straddling and highly
migratory fish stocks, the Draft Agreement for the implementation of the provisions
of the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas of 10 December 1982, relating to the
conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, known
simply as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, entered into force in 2001 (United Na-
tions 2001). The most important aspect of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement is that
both coastal states and DWFNs are required to cooperate in managing the fish
stocks either bilaterally, multilaterally, or through the establishment of Regional
Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), as appropriate. Thus, while clearly
defined property rights have not been established for the high seas, indistinct prop-
erty rights have been allocated to all users of marine resources that straddle the
EEZs and high seas (coastal states and DWFNs) for management and conservation.
A number of RFMOs for tuna have been established both prior to, and in re-
sponse to, the establishment of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. In 1950, the
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) was established to maintain the
populations of tuna, and other fish stocks taken by tuna vessels, in the Eastern Pa-
cific Ocean (IATTC 1949). While its principal duties are to coordinate research and
development activities and recommend appropriate conservation measures, the
IATTC has also played a minor role in tuna management. The Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission (IOTC), established in 1993 and adopted in 1996, contributes to im-
proving knowledge of tuna resources in the region, coordinating research and
development activities, and reviewing the economic and social aspects of fish stocks
(IOTC 1993). Like the IATTC, the IOTC has played a limited role in conservation
and management measures. However, it is envisaged that such measures are likely to
be adopted in time by both these RFMOs (Hedley 2002).
The overexploitation of bigeye tuna and the negotiation of the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement have alerted PICs and DWFNs to the need for cooperation in managing
the WCP tuna stocks. This led to the September 2000 signing of the Multilateral
High Level Convention (MHLC) on the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in the WCP Ocean (MHLC 2000). All coastal and DWFNs
(except Japan) signed the Convention, which requires the establishment of a WCP
Tuna Commission that will be responsible for promoting cooperation and coordina-
tion between members to ensure the conservation of fish stocks. The Commission
does not have an organisational structure as yet and, due to the time needed for rati-
fication, it is not expected to come into force until at least 2004. Thus, it is timely at
this formative stage to discuss how to strengthen the organization and encourage co-
operation amongst PICs and DWFNs in the WCP.4
4 Note that the WCP tuna fishery is termed a ‘straddling’ stock, as resources move between the EEZs
and adjacent high seas. Kaitala and Munro (1993) observe that the economics of ‘shared’ resources
(which refers to resources that are shared between one or more coastal states), which are reasonably
well developed, take us only part way in explaining the economics of straddling stocks, a field of re-
search that is relatively undeveloped to date.Chand, Grafton, and Petersen 334
Current Institutional Structure of the Western and Central Pacific Tuna
Fishery
Ten DWFNs that fish in the WCP region account for 86% of the total tuna harvest.
The four largest countries in terms of catches are Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and
the United States (Secretariat of the Pacific Community 2000). Most coastal states
are subject to almost continual bilateral approaches for access by the mobile distant
water fishing fleets (Cartwright and Willock 1999), and PICs allocate fishing entitle-
ments to DWFNs mainly through international treaties. These treaties are negotiated
because DWFNs have a cost advantage in harvesting and marketing tuna over PICs.
Thus, by allowing DWFNs to harvest their tuna resources, both parties can poten-
tially be better off.
An illustration of the potential cost differences between DWFNs and PICs is
given in figure 2. In this example, we assume density-dependent growth for tuna re-
sources, a competitive market for tuna, and linear harvesting costs for both DWFNs
and PICs. In the absence of cooperation or a bilateral treaty, the biomass that maxi-
mizes the rent to the PICs is X*PIC. This biomass exceeds the open-access or
bionomic equilibrium (X’PIC) under sole coastal state exploitation where the fishery
generates no rents for the PICs. By assumption, the DWFN has lower harvesting
costs than the PICs, and the biomass that maximizes its rents is X*DWFN, where
X*DWFN < X*PIC. Thus, the lower cost DWFN will be less conservative in its harvest-
ing and exploit at a lower level of the biomass than the higher cost PICs.5 It follows,
therefore, that successful joint exploitation of the tuna resources requires agreement
on  both the division of rents and the appropriate level of exploitation. Moreover,
given that tuna migrate across jurisdictions and on the high seas, overall rent maxi-
mizing harvest and biomass levels requires cooperation from all parties, DWFNs
and PICs.
With the exception of a multilateral treaty negotiated between the United States
and the 16 PICs, all treaties between DWFNs and PICs are bilateral. PICs have been
reluctant to enter into multilateral agreements for several reasons. First, there exists
a perception by PICs that such agreements may compromise their sovereign rights.
Second, the lack of supporting institutions that could compel or impose an agree-
ment among PICs hinders their development. Third, the benefits and costs of
implementing new institutions are likely to be unevenly distributed between PICs.
Fourth, some PICs fear that multilateral agreements may jeopardize bilateral aid
(Petersen 2002).
Petersen (2002) argues that existing bilateral treaties do not reflect the true
value of the resource rent, are not transparent, give incentives to underreport, and do
not ensure that the least-cost harvesters are allocated the access right. The politically
independent PICs cooperate closely on establishing these treaties with the Forum
Fisheries Agency. However, decisions about defining protocols for fishing rights,
the negotiation of the rights (including the appropriate access fee level or equivalent
level of total harvesting rights), and the means by which the rights are enforced are
the responsibility of the individual PICs. While all vessels fishing in the region must
be licensed, few restrictions are placed on the number of vessels; hence licensing
acts predominantly as a mechanism for monitoring fishing activity.
5 Munro (1979) analyzed the case where two countries exploit a common transboundary fishery. If they
both have the same discount rates, and if the lower cost country exploited the resource unilaterally, it
would harvest at a lower biomass level than if its neighbor were the sole harvester.Multilateral Governance of Fisheries: The Case of WCP Tuna 335
Figure 2.  Illustration of Bionomic and Rent-maximizing Biomass Levels for a
Distant Water Fishing Nation (DWFN) and a Pacific Island Country (PIC)
Legend: TC = total harvesting costs, TR = total revenue, X’DWFN = bionomic equilibrium for
DWFN, X’PIC = bionomic equilibrium for PIC, X*DWFN = rent maximizing biomass for
DWFN, X*PIC = rent maximizing biomass for PIC
Rents in the Tuna Fisheries
Limited research has been conducted on estimating the rent potential of the WCP
tuna fishery. Bertignac et al. (2000) use a tuna population dynamics model (spatially
disagreggated, multi-gear, multi-species model) to determine an optimal harvest
size, age, and technology structure for the fishery, given the objective of maximiz-
ing economic rents in the long run. They assume access fees equal to 4% of the
gross revenues of DWFNs and that tuna prices vary as a function of the harvest.6
Their model indicates that the economic rent of the WCP would double if fishing ef-
fort were reduced and if exploitation shifted from younger to older cohorts (due to
decreased costs and increased prices).
6 Bertignac et al. (2000) estimated the demand elasticity for raw tuna supplied to the canning markets by
purse-seine and pole-and-line fleets in the South Pacific to be 1.55 and that of the fresh and frozen tuna
supplied by longline fleets to be 2.53.Chand, Grafton, and Petersen 336
Their study suggests that the overall level of effort and fleet structure of the
fishery are suboptimal. Given that the rent potential is much larger than rents pres-
ently accruing from the fishery, that the sustainability of the stock is in jeopardy,
and that cooperation is required to maximize long-term revenues from the fishery,
several unanswered questions remain. What institutional structure will help ensure
one, an increase in total rents; two, an increase in the proportion of the rents that
accrue to PICs; and three, the continued sustainability of the resource? The follow-
ing section provides an innovative model to conceptualize the problem and help
design a potential remedy.
The Model
To assess the potential benefits of cooperation in the WCP tuna fisheries, we de-
velop  a  model  where  the  aggregate  catch  is  represented  by  the  following
Cobb-Douglas production function of the form:




where capital letters are used to denote aggregate quantities such that Q denotes to-
tal catch, K the industry capital stock, and L the total number of fishers. S denotes a
steady-state stock (biomass)7 of fish for given institutional controls placed on the to-
tal catch, represented here by t. Other factors beyond the control of policymakers
that may impinge on S are denoted by w. The policy instrument, t, can be a tax, tar-
iff, or charge on harvest, or the market price of tradable harvesting rights. The price
and quantity instruments are identical in this model, as there is no uncertainty over
the stock, catch, or prices.
Each of the factors in equation (1) are essential for production, since a zero in-
put of any one factor results in zero output. The relationship depicted in equation (1)
may be thought of as a steady-state relationship between total harvest and stocks for
a given institutional regime. S is bounded from above by the biological carrying ca-
pacity of the ocean and could be zero when the stock is totally depleted. The former
is possible when t is relatively large, while the latter arises for lower (including
negative) values of t. The above implies a positive association between t and S, as
shown by the right-hand side inequality in equation (1), above.
An individual fisher’s production function can be depicted as the intensive-form
equivalent of equation (1) as:
q = kaS, (2)
where for ease of notation we write the steady-state stock as S, and small letters are
used to denote per-fisher values for the variables in capital letters, individual catch
is assumed to be too small to impact on S. Assuming a unit price of fish, the after-
tax economic profits accruing to an individual fisher is given by:
p = (1 - t ) q - rk, (3)
7 Biomass is a composite measure of stock numbers and size, the rent optimisation of which requires
considerations around harvest size and technology to be employed.Multilateral Governance of Fisheries: The Case of WCP Tuna 337
where r denotes the rental rate on capital. Profit maximization, through the choice of
the level of k by individual fishers, yields the steady-state stock of capital as:
k* =












Equation (4) shows that the steady-state level of k increases with a rise in capi-
tal productivity and/or stock of fish and falls with a rise in the rental rate of capital,
but is ambiguous to changes in t. While a rise in t lowers after-tax profits to the
fisher, it also raises the steady-state stock of fish. These two effects work in oppo-
site directions on k and are central to being able to use a tax instrument, or an
equivalent quantity instrument, to maximize rents and ensure sustainability of the
resource.
Each fisher takes t as given in choosing the level of effort, implying that the
government acts as a Stackelberg leader in this game. Let the government maximize
steady-state rents, R, from imposing a tariff, t, on total catch, Q:
R = tQ = tLq = tLk aS. (5)
Substituting the steady-state value of k* into equation (5) and maximizing R, by
the choice of t, gives the following first-order condition for the revenue function:
dR
dt


















where a = (a/r)a/(1–a)L. The expression in equation (6) can be considerably simplified
by setting a = 0.5 and letting ¶S/¶t = k, a constant. These restrictions neither change
the basic structure of the model nor the qualitative findings of the analysis, but sim-






L - (L + 2r - 2kLS)t - 2kLSt 2 [ ]. (6a)
Equation (6a) shows the revenue function is cubic in the tax rate, t, since its
first derivative is quadratic. Solving for the two turning points for t in terms of rev-
enues, R, yields:
t* =
-(L + 2r - 2kLS) ± (.)2 + 8kL2S
4kLS
. (7)
Inspection of equation (7) suggests that R is minimized for the negative value of
t* and maximized for the positive value of t*. This relation is depicted in figure 3. A
subsidy of t*
x leads to the stock being driven to zero such that revenues are nil. Note
that as t* increases from t*
n to positive values, revenue increases. Hence, t*
n has a
knife-edge property. Revenue is maximized at t*
p, which is also a stable equilibrium.
The implication for policy is clear—the policymaker raises any positive tax rate or
sets the total allowable catch (TAC) for the harvesting rights to the point where rev-
enue is maximized, this being akin to following the arrows leading to t*
p. TheChand, Grafton, and Petersen 338
immediate question the model raises is how to set a level t for the WCP tuna fisher-
ies so as to maximize rents from the fisheries.
To arrive at t*
p, the assumption of a single policymaker is crucial, and this find-
ing supports results of game-theoretical models of straddling stock fisheries (e.g.,
Arnason, Magnusson, and Agnarsson 2000) that show that competitive games lead
to exhaustion of the fishery, whereas cooperative games (which produce single
policymaker-type conditions) can maximize long-term returns from the fishery. This
need for cooperation has been recognised in the UN Fish Stocks Agreements, where
RFMOs are required to manage straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. The fol-
lowing section presents a proposed multilateral governance structure for the WCP to
achieve the desired outcomes of this model—cooperation between PICs and
DWFNs.
Figure 3. Stock of Fish (S), Resource Rents (R), and Tariff Rates (t)Multilateral Governance of Fisheries: The Case of WCP Tuna 339
Towards a Cooperative Governance Structure for the Western and
Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries
Successful governance of fisheries, at a minimum, requires the following. First,
fishers should be actively involved in the comanagement of the resources (Grafton
2000). Second, total exploitation rates are accepted by most resource users and set at
levels that ensure ongoing sustainability of the fishery. Third, fishers have both a
long-term interest in the resource and individual incentives, which help ensure that
private or self-interest is compatible with the collective good. In addition to these
criteria, multilateral governance of fisheries also requires that all countries voluntar-
ily cooperate in joint management, abide by the agreed to rules of exploitation, and
support a mechanism for restricting new entrants into the fishery.8
The biggest difficulty in obtaining cooperation of all parties in fisheries gover-
nance is to meet the participation constraint; that is, ensure each party is at least as
well off with cooperation than without it. In addition, a mechanism must also exist
to ensure that a cooperative outcome can be monitored and enforced with sufficient
penalties to discourage noncompliance. In the case of the WCP tuna fisheries, sub-
stantial benefits exist for all parties in terms of cooperation. These include the
potential for tuna to be caught at an older age, thus significantly raising the price per
kilogram of the fish harvested. If stocks are being economically overexploited, as
argued by Bertignac et al. (2000), reduced harvests have the potential to raise the
present value of rents from the fisheries. A cooperative agreement, that includes re-
strictions on new entrants, can also raise future returns by reducing rent dissipation.
Moreover, if cooperation permits the creation of exclusive, tradable, and divisible
harvesting rights, it allows fishers with the highest marginal net returns to increase
their share of the harvest, thus increasing the rents in the fishery. Finally, if harvest-
ing rights are not made region-specific, with the exception of imposed bans for
biological reasons to protect spawning areas and young cohorts, fishers have the
flexibility to fish wherever it is economically optimal (without being confined to
state boundaries), further increasing efficiency in the fishery.
To help meet the criteria for improved management from the WCP tuna fisher-
ies, a multilateral governance mechanism for tuna (MGMT) is proposed. Our
proposal puts into practice the model presented earlier. However, the details of how
to establish a MGMT require a great deal more empirical research and would also be
subject to considerable negotiation that goes beyond the scope of this paper. Central
to a successful MGMT would be a Tuna Commission that would act as a single
policymaker and would use either a price or quantity instrument (represented by t in
our model) to control harvests and yield desirable steady-state levels of the tuna
stocks. Given the virtual political impossibility of imposing a differential fee or
price instrument on PICs and DWFNs, we explore only the case of harvesting rights
or quantity controls that would correspond to a price t.
This proposed management scheme encourages voluntary cooperation amongst
PICs and DWFNs with an incentive of increasing long-run revenue. An outline of
what the proposed institutional structure could be, and the details that would need to
be addressed by all parties in establishing a MGMT, are provided under a series of
headings. These include the functions of the Tuna Commission, the initial allocation
of harvesting rights, the setting of a TAC, monitoring and enforcement, and the po-
tential benefits for PICs and DWFNs.
8 Munro (1996) emphasizes that without restriction on new entrants, any cooperative agreement will al-
most certainly be unstable because extra effort by entrants reduces the benefits from cooperation rela-
tive to noncooperation.Chand, Grafton, and Petersen 340
Multilateral Governance and the Tuna Commission
At the core of the MGMT would be a Tuna Commission that would arbitrate dis-
putes, facilitate cooperation, set harvest levels for the whole region, and support the
exclusivity of tuna harvesting rights. Current DWFNs and PICs would be members
of the Tuna Commission, and each would be allocated gratis annually renewable
tuna harvesting rights (THRs) based on a formula that, while reflecting both coastal state
rights and past catch levels of DWFNs, would be the outcome of negotiations.9 THRs
would be freely tradable over a 12-month period and divisible. Member countries (both
DWFNs and PICs) would have the right to assign their allotted THRs in whatever fash-
ion they wish, provided that they were ultimately used by a vessel registered by one of
the countries party to the commission. Monitoring and enforcement of management
regulations in the high seas would be undertaken by the Tuna Commission, but with
the assistance of member countries. On a cost recovery basis, the Tuna Commission
could also assist in the policing of the EEZ of PICs, if so invited, but would have
the right to verify that coastal states and DWFNs were in compliance with manage-
ment regulations. To help ensure self-policing, violations of management rules and
regulations (such as overfishing or fishing in prohibited areas) could involve punish-
ment of both the vessel owner and the member country under which flag it operates.
To help ensure a more competitive market for THRs, each member country
could be required to surrender 3% of their allocation every year to the Commission
to be sold by tender to the highest bidder (the design and frequency of the tender is a
matter for further research). This initial allocation draws from the experience of
trading sulfur dioxide allowances by US electric utilities—the world’s largest pollu-
tion permit trading scheme. Holders of sulfur dioxide allowances are obliged to
provide 2.8% of their total allocation at an auction held once per year. Revenue from
the auction is returned to the utilities based on the proportion of allowances they
contributed to the auction. The auction process has helped to “jump start” the trad-
ing of sulfur dioxide allowances, provided an important price signal to prospective
buyers and sellers about the value of allowances (Joskow, Schmalensee, and Bailey
1998), and yielded important information to assess the market performance of the
scheme (Carlson et al. 2000).
Following the successful example of the sulfur dioxide scheme, all proceeds of
the tuna tender would revert back to members based on their contribution to the ten-
der. All parties would have the option of offering up to a 100% of all their THRs via
tender, should they wish. One of the key benefits of the tender process would be to
provide information to PICs regarding the market rent for harvesting tuna that is
currently kept confidential by PICS and DWFNs under the present bilateral treaty
arrangements. Thus PICs, at their option, could continue to engage in bilateral or
multilateral treaties with DWFNs with the benefits of this extra information from
the tender process to inform these negotiations.
Ongoing and overhead costs of the Tuna Commission would be paid for by a
levy on the value of the tuna catch. Countries not party to the original agreement
would be permitted to become part of the Tuna Commission for a negotiated fee, but
would be obliged to lease annual THRs from existing members to harvest tuna.10
This approach, using “transferable membership,” has been shown by Pintassilgo and
9 These rights assume that the members of the Commission acquire collective de facto property rights to
the resource as shown to be required for successful cooperative governance by Munro (2000).
10 Such an arrangement precludes the necessity of creating “individual transferable memberships” as
proposed for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO) by Munro (1996) or a two-tier allo-
cation system proposed for the same organization by Grafton and Lane (1998).Multilateral Governance of Fisheries: The Case of WCP Tuna 341
Costa Duarte (2000) to help resolve the potential new member threat to reduce rents
and would help give existing country members an ongoing, long-term interest in the
fisheries.
Initial Allocation of Harvesting Rights
It is envisaged that the biggest stumbling block to the successful creation of the
MGMT would be the initial allocation of THRs. The expected return from joining
the multilateral agreement for each party would have to exceed the payoff from not
joining. Although cooperation may potentially benefit all parties, the possibility ex-
ists for strategic bargaining by one or more parties such that a proposed allocation
may offer some parties less than they would receive without cooperation. Thus, in
the absence of complete information on the “threat points” of each party to the
agreement, the possibility exists that noncooperation is a stable equilibrium. Such a
situation would resemble the non-cooperation that sometimes occurs with the ex-
ploitation of common pools, such as oil fields, where joint or cooperative behaviour
is hampered by asymmetry in information about the value of the parties’ own and
others, drilling rights (Libecap 1989).
Arnason, Magnusson, and Agnarsson (2000) and Brasao, Costa-Duarte, and
Cunha-e-Sa (2000) have also argued that cooperative multilateral governance is not
stable unless side payments are feasible. Nevertheless, the cooperative solution can
generate much higher aggregate profits than other solutions, giving ample incentives
to reach an agreement. Recent cooperation by all parties (with the exception of Ja-
pan) in the form of the MHLC suggests that DWFNs and PICs are able to negotiate
in favor of their collective interests.
Total Allowable Catch (TAC)
Our proposal is that the Tuna Commission would impose a TAC on all tuna species
for the whole region through which they migrate. We suggest that the TAC would
not specify where the fish could be caught, except designating no-fish zones based
on spawning and regeneration patterns of the fish stocks. The setting of the TAC
would be informed by biological research by the Secretariat of the Pacific Commu-
nity and consistent with the yield that maximizes the present value of rents in the
fishery. We suggest that the TAC be assessed regularly and revised and updated us-
ing an optimal feedback rule as part of an active adaptive management approach, as
outlined by Grafton, Sandal, and Steinshamn (2000).
Bertignac et al. (2000) suggest that the TAC for all tuna species would almost
certainly be less than current rates of exploitation. This implies a reduction in the
overall current fishing effort. A lower harvest rate may also be justified by the pre-
cautionary principle of management, as the current exploitation rate is viewed by
some as imposing a risk on the sustainability of some tuna species (Secretariat of
the Pacific Community 2002). The reduction in harvest in our model would corre-
spond with an increase in t to the point where steady-state revenues are maximized.
Monitoring and Enforcement
While acknowledging the PICs sovereignty in allocating their own funds to monitor-
ing and enforcement purposes, it is envisaged that the Tuna Commission would bear
most of the monitoring and enforcement burden due likely to economies of scopeChand, Grafton, and Petersen 342
and scale. For example, aircraft used in one jurisdiction could also be used in an-
other EEZ, or for high-seas monitoring (Grafton 2000). Costs of monitoring
compliance are also likely to decrease over time with technological improvements.
For example, the installation of a video on each vessel, which can be monitored
through satellite, will enable the Tuna Commission to verify fishing activity. Video
monitoring, coupled with a Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) where vessels are fit-
ted with an automatic location communicator that sends signals via satellite giving
vessel location, speed, and heading would be a cost-effective approach to ensuring
compliance. Vessels not fitted with such equipment, or not registered in a member
country, would be prohibited from fishing in both the high seas and the EEZs of the
PICs.
The proposed institutional structure is likely to encourage self-enforcement, as
holders of THRs would help monitor illegal fishing, as noncompliance by others de-
creases the economic rents accruing from their own quota. Similar self-enforcement
mechanisms have been shown to be effective in other fisheries (Duncan and Temu
1997). Moreover, further self-enforcement can be assured by penalizing the entire
country’s fleet for law infringements made by individual vessels bearing that
country’s flag. Thus, vessels from each country would have the incentive to monitor
fishing activity of vessels from their own country.
Potential Benefits
The proposed governance structure offers substantial benefits to both PICs and
DWFNs. First, cooperation gives greater scope for countries to set a regional TAC
for tuna that will help to maximize the regional resource rents, potentially increasing
every country’s net returns from fishing. Second, cooperation would also allow tuna
to be caught at an older age, thereby increasing returns per kilogram, as well as en-
suring the total harvest was set at a rent-maximizing level. Third, the approach
provides a way to prevent free access into the fisheries and mitigates the “race to
fish” while complying with United Nations agreements on fisheries. Fourth, it al-
lows tuna to be traded at its marginal value and in a more competitive structure that
can benefit both coastal states and low-cost tuna harvesters. Fifth, it provides the
opportunity for countries to reap the benefits of economies of size and scope in the
management and monitoring of tuna resources.
Concluding Remarks
It is clear from the literature that the PICs are not maximizing net returns from the
WCP tuna fisheries, and that current management is not ensuring the long-term
sustainability of fish stocks. A model, new to the literature, is developed that illus-
trates that long-term net revenue of highly migratory and straddling fish stocks is
maximized through the introduction of tax-like controls, or an equivalent quantity
instrument, by a sole policymaker. The model indicates that the PICs could increase
long-term net revenue by cooperating with each other and DWFNs to achieve sole
policymaker-type outcomes.
The paper provides an application of this model to the WCP tuna fisheries in a
proposed new governance structure for the region that encourages cooperation
amongst PICs and DWFNs. The cooperative structure has the potential to offer sig-
nificant benefits to both existing DWFNs and PICs.
The proposed multilateral governance mechanism for tuna would create a Tuna
Commission that would be answerable to participating member countries and com-Multilateral Governance of Fisheries: The Case of WCP Tuna 343
ply with the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (as has been created in the West-
ern and Central Pacific Tuna Commission). Initial membership would be granted to
PICs with EEZs in the region and current DWFNs. Each member country would be
allocated gratis annual transferable, divisible tuna harvesting rights that would be
allocated to both DWFNs and PICs on a negotiated formula. The harvesting rights
could be used by any vessel legally registered and authorized to fish by one of the
member countries. Every authorized vessel would also have to comply with all man-
agement and monitoring regulations set down by the Tuna Commission.
To promote a competitive market for harvesting rights, each member would sur-
render a small proportion (say 3%) of its annual allocation to the Tuna Commission
for tender to the highest bidder, but would receive the full receipts from such sales.
In addition, member countries would have the option of tendering up to 100% of
their annual allocation if they believed it would generate a higher return than using
the rights themselves or leasing them on a bilateral basis. New country entrants into
the tuna fisheries would be permitted for a negotiated fee, but they would need to
lease tuna harvesting rights from existing members to be able to fish.
Our proposed multilateral governance structure for the management of tuna is
intended to be a first step in the adoption of a rent maximizing, but sustainable, gov-
ernance  framework  for  the  region.  The  greatest  difficulty  associated  with
establishing such a structure will be the initial allocation of tuna harvesting rights
and the setting of the regional TACs. These potential hurdles are the subject of fur-
ther research.
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